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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Donald Nelson Barger, Jr., appeals from the judgment of the district court on one
count of possession of a controlled substance.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state charged Barger with possession ofhydrocodone with a persistent violator
enhancement. (R., pp. 50-53.) At a pre-trial hearing Barger made a pro-se motion to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. (6/13/18 Tr., p. 5, L. 17 - p. 7, L. 24.) The basis for the
motion was an argument that the state had failed to establish such things as "the name of
the accusers," "the damages," "the intent jurisdiction," "the subject matter jurisdiction," or
the "in personna [sic] jurisdiction." (6/13/18 Tr., p. 7, L. 25 - p. 10, L. 2.) The district
court denied the motion. (6/13/18 Tr., p. 10, Ls. 3-4.)
Barger pied guilty to the possession charge, preserving the "right to Appeal prior
adverse rulings" by the district court, in exchange for the state dismissing the enhancement.
(R., pp. 81-90; 8/30/18 Tr., p. 4, L. 20-p. 20, L. 11.) The district court imposed a sentence
of five years with one year determinate and entered judgment. (R., pp. 95-97.) Barger
filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp. 98-101.)
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ISSUES
Barger states the issues on appeal as:
I.

Did the district court violate Mr. Barger's constitutional right to due
process by failing to order a competency evaluation pursuant to
Idaho Code § 18-211?

II.

Did the district court err in denying Mr. Barger' s pro se motion to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction?

(Appellant's brief, p. 7.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Was Barger' s claim of error for not sua sponte ordering an evaluation under I. C. §
18-211 waived by the guilty plea?

2.

Has Barger failed to show a lack of jurisdiction in the district court?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Barger's Claim Of Error For Not Sua Sponte Ordering An Evaluation Under I.C. § 18211 Was Waived By The Guilty Plea
A.

Introduction
Barger contends, for the first time on appeal, that the district court erred by not sua

sponte ordering a competency evaluation under I.C. § 18-211. (Appellant's brief, pp. 815.) This argument fails because it was not preserved in the conditional guilty plea and
was therefore waived. Even if the waived claim is considered, Barger has failed to show
that the district court committed fundamental error by not ordering an evaluation in the
absence of a request from defense counsel.

B.

Standard Of Review
"A plea agreement is contractual in nature, must be measured by contract law

standards, and as a question oflaw, this Court exercises free review." State v. Cope, 142
Idaho 492, 495, 129 P.3d 1241, 1244 (2006).
Where a claim of error unpreserved by a contemporaneous objection is presented
on appeal, the Court applies a three step review. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226, 245
P .3d 961, 978 (2010). First, the appellant must show that "one or more . . . unwaived
constitutional rights were violated." Id. Second, "the error must be clear or obvious." Id.
"This means the record must contain evidence of the error and the record must also contain
evidence as to whether or not trial counsel made a tactical decision in failing to object."
State v. Miller, 165 Idaho 115, _ , 443 P.3d 129, 133 (2019). "If the record does not
contain evidence regarding whether counsel's decision was strategic, the claim is factual
in nature and thus more appropriately addressed via a petition for post-conviction relief."
3

Id. Finally, the appellant "must demonstrate that the error affected [his or her] substantial
rights." Perry. 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. "Whether the error affected the trial
proceedings must be clear from the appellate record." Miller, 165 Idaho at

, 443 P.3d

at 133.

C.

Barger's Guilty Plea Waived Claims Not Based On Rulings Made By The District
Court
"Ordinarily, a plea of guilty, if voluntarily and knowingly made, is conclusive as to

the defendant's guilt and waives all non-jurisdictional defects in prior proceedings against
the defendant." State v. Green, 130 Idaho 503, 505, 943 P.2d 929, 931 (1997). Thus, an
unconditional plea waives the right to challenge a competency finding on appeal. State v.
Al-Kotrani, 141 Idaho 66, 69-70, 106 P.3d 392, 395-96 (2005); Green, 130 Idaho at 506,
943 P.2d at 932. "However, non-jurisdictional defects can be preserved for appeal by
entering a I.C.R. 1 l(a)(2) conditional plea of guilty, reserving in writing the right to review
any specified adverse ruling." State v. Kelchner, 130 Idaho 37, 39, 936 P.2d 680, 682
(1997).

The Court will not address on appeal non-jurisdictional issues not properly

preserved by the unconditional plea. State v. Hosey, 134 Idaho 883, 889, 11 P.3d 1101,
1107 (2000). Unless an issue is preserved in the conditional guilty plea agreement "a
defendant may not retain the benefits of a plea bargain in the form of concessions from the
State" without waiving unpreserved issues. State v. Wilhelm, 135 Idaho 111, 117, 15 P.3d
824, 830 (Ct. App. 2000).
In this case, Barger preserved the "right to Appeal prior adverse rulings" by the
district court. (R., p. 89 (emphasis added); see also 8/30/18 Tr., p. 4, L. 20 - p. 20, L. 11.)
He has neither shown nor claimed an "adverse ruling" on whether he should be given an
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LC. § 18-211 evaluation. By preserving challenges to rulings of the court, by its plain
language the conditional guilty plea waived claims of fundamental error which, by
definition, are not challenges to rulings made by the district court. Because there is no
adverse ruling challenged by this claim, the claim that the district court erred by not making
a ruling on whether Barger should be given a competency evaluation was not preserved
but was waived in the plea agreement.
Even if Barger had not waived claims of fundamental error by the plain language
of his conditional plea agreement, Barger has still failed to show any of the three parts of
a fundamental error claim.

"The failure to observe procedures adequate to protect a

defendant's right not to be tried or convicted while incompetent to stand trial deprives him
of his due process right to a fair trial." State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 62, 90 P.3d 278,
287 (2003). "A trial court has no duty to independently inquire as to the competency of a
defendant unless the defendant raised the issue by motion or by presenting evidence

showing a lack of competency." State v. Hayes, 138 Idaho 761, 764, 69 P.3d 181, 184 (Ct.
App. 2003) (emphasis added) (citing State v. Fuchs, 100 Idaho 341, 346, 597 P.2d 227,
232 (1979)). Where, as here, the issue has not been explicitly raised, the trial court must

sua sponte order a competency evaluation only if the evidence before it raises a good faith
or bona fide doubt regarding the defendant's ability to understand the nature of the
proceedings and assist in his own defense. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966);
Fuchs, 100 Idaho at 346-47, 597 P.2d at 232-33; Hayes, 138 Idaho at 764, 69 P.3d at 184.
See also Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 603-04 (9 th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted)
(state trial judge must sua sponte conduct competency hearing if there is "substantial
evidence of incompetence"); Bassett v. McCarthy. 549 F.2d 616, 619 (9 th Cir. 1977)
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(citations omitted) ("[D]ue process requires the trial judge to hold a competency hearing
on his own motion only where the record as a whole discloses substantial evidence
sufficient to raise a genuine doubt in the mind of a reasonable trial judge concerning the
defendant's competence.").

"A person is mentally competent to enter a plea if he

understands his right to constitutional due process and counsel, confrontation of witnesses,
freedom from compulsion to testify, right to trial by jury, understands the nature of the
charge against him, and is capable of understanding the legal consequences of guilt."
Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 547-48, 531 P.2d 1187, 1192-93 (1975).
The record not only fails to establish a clear and prejudicial constitutional violation,
it affirmatively disproves Barger' s claim of fundamental error. First, although Barger had
disagreements with his attorney and wanted to present novel legal theories, Barger has cited
to nothing in the record indicating he did not understand his rights, the charges, or the
consequences of pleading guilty. (Appellant's brief, pp. 10-11 (Barger made "irrational"
jurisdictional arguments and "bizarre" statements, behaved offensively in court, and
counsel stated issues with communicating effectively).) Although counsel had some
concerns regarding his communications with Barger, counsel did not express concerns
regarding Barger's competency. Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 59, 106 P.3d 376, 385
(2004) ("While the opinion of ... counsel certainly is not determinative, a defendant's
counsel is in the best position to evaluate a client's comprehension of the proceedings."
(internal citations omitted)). More importantly, the district court conducted a thorough
plea colloquy, during which Barger testified that he understood his rights and demonstrated
an understanding of the plea agreement, the charge, and the consequences of pleading
guilty. (8/30/18 Tr., p. 12, L. 16 - p. 20, L. 8.)
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Specifically, Barger testified, under oath during his plea colloquy, that he had never
been “treated or counseled for any mental illness, disease or disorder.” (8/30/18 Tr., p. 13,
Ls. 12-14.) He testified that there was “nothing” about his “mental condition” that would
“impair or impact [his] ability to understand” the proceedings. (8/30/18 Tr., p. 13, Ls. 2125.) He knew the charge was a felony and was able to recite to the court the potential
penalties he faced. (8/30/18 Tr., p. 15, Ls. 12-21.) He was satisfied with his counsel’s
representation, had discussed the facts of the case and possible defenses with him, and had
reviewed with counsel his constitutional and other rights. (8/30/18 Tr., p. 15, Ls. 7-11; p.
16, Ls. 5-11; p. 18, Ls. 10-24.) Barger testified that he understood his constitutional rights,
including the presumption of innocence, the right to a jury trial, the state’s burden of proof,
his right against compelled self-incrimination, and his right to confrontation of the
witnesses against him. (8/30/18 Tr., p. 16, L. 16 – p. 17, L. 19.) The district court, based
on the colloquy, specifically found the plea knowingly and voluntarily entered. (8/30/18
Tr., p. 20, Ls. 5-8.)
This record does not raise a good faith or bona fide doubt regarding Barger’s ability
to understand the nature of the proceedings and assist in his own defense, much less make
it clear that a competency evaluation was required. Nor is it clear on this record that, had
the issue been raised, an evaluation would ultimately have been ordered, much less that a
finding of incompetency would have been made. None of the three elements of a
fundamental error claim—a constitutional error, clear on the record, and prejudicial to the
defendant on the face of the record—is present in this case.
Barger affirmatively waived this claim by pleading guilty without preserving any
claim that he was entitled to an I.C. § 18-211 competency evaluation. Even if not
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afﬁrmatively waived, Barger has shown n0 fundamental error because

it is

not clear 0n the

record that the district court should have had a good faith 0r bona ﬁde doubt regarding
Barger’s competency in the face 0f Barger’s testimony that he understood the proceedings,
the charges, the consequences he faced and his rights, and

was

able to discuss these things

With counsel.

II.

Barger Has Failed T0
A.

In

The

District Court

Introduction

Barger claimed the
“the

Show A Lack Of Jurisdiction

name of the

accusers,

district court

79
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lacked jurisdiction because the state had not pled

the damages,

79

‘6

the intent jurisdiction,

’3

66

the subject matter

jurisdiction,” or the “in personna [sic] jurisdiction.” (6/13/18 Tr., p. 5, L. 17

The

district court

On

denied the motion. (6/13/18 TL,

10, L. 2.)

p. 10, Ls. 3-4.)

appeal Barger, through counsel, recognizes the lack 0f legal merit to the claim

that district court lacked jurisdiction, but nevertheless requests this

district court

lacked jurisdiction. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 15-16.)

the claim that the district court lacked jurisdiction

B.

— p.

Standard
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As

Court t0 conclude the
all-but

acknowledged,

without merit.

Of Review

Jurisdiction

is

“a question of law” that

is

reviewed de novo.

159 Idaho 768, 770, 367 P.3d 163, 165 (2016) (citing State

252 P.3d 1255, 1257 (201

1)).

V. Lute,

State V. Schmierer,

150 Idaho 837, 839,
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District

Court

Had Jurisdiction

“Subject matter jurisdiction
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V. Lute,
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150 Idaho 837, 840, 252 P.3d 1255, 1258 (201

1) (internal

quotes omitted). Idaho courts have “subj ect matter jurisdiction over a crime if any essential

element 0f the crime, including the
91

1,

result,

by the ﬁling of an

committed

in the State

(2016) (quoting State

Doyle, 121 Idaho

‘information, indictment, 0r complaint alleging an offense

of Idaho.’” State
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“Subject matter jurisdiction in a criminal case

914, 828 P.2d 1316, 1319 (1992).
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occurs Within Idaho.” State

V.

McIntosh, 160 Idaho

1, 6,

is

was

368 P.3d 621, 626

Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 228, 91 P.3d 1127, 1132 (2004)).

The charging document

in this case alleges Barger violated Idaho

2732(c)(1) in the State of Idaho.

(R., p. 50.)

It

Code

section 37-

therefore conferred jurisdiction

0n the

district court.

Barger contends that the pleading did not confer jurisdiction because
allegations as a Victim

and damages.

(Appellant’s brief, p. 15.)

Barger

it

lacked such

cites

n0

legal

authority that such allegations are jurisdictional requirements. State V. Zichko, 129 Idaho

259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996)

(“When

issues

0n appeal

are not supported

by

propositions of law, authority, 0r argument, they will not be considered”).

Because the

charging document alleged Barger committed a crime in the state 0f Idaho, the

district court

had jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Court t0 afﬁrm the judgment of conviction.

DATED this 22nd day 0f August, 2019.

/s/

Kenneth K. Jorgensen

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 22nd day of August, 2019, served a true and
copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below by

I

correct

means 0f iCourt

File

and Serve:

ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

/s/

Kenneth K. Jorgensen

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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